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1. Introduction 
France and the UK face similar geostrategic  circumstances: both were once Great Powers and 
still retain their positions among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. During the 
Cold War both were dwarfed by the super-powers and were thus extremely sensitive about their 
status: what the French called their grandeur and the British called their seat at the top table. 
Despite their strategic similarities, they have differed in many of their defence policy choices and in 
particular how they  balanced their strategic aspirations with their limited financial resources. Thus a 
comparison of British and French defence policies provides a revealing case study of military choices.  
During the 1980s Jacques Fontanel and I conducted a comparative study of the defence effort in 
France and the UK, some of the results of which appeared in Fontanel  & Smith (1985). That work 
was largely quantitative and directed to answering very specific and well defined questions. Here I 
will provide a more qualitative comparison of the structure and evolution of British and French 
defence policy. I will adopt an economic framework to structure this discussion based on the ‘value 
chain’ used in Smith (2009). The defence budget is set in the light of ability to pay and perceived 
threat. This budget buys forces, troops and equipment.  The amount of forces acquired depends on 
the efficiency of the acquisition process and of the defence industry. This force structure provides 
military capability, including the ability to intervene in conflicts. This military capability supports the 
strategy by which a country maintains its security, given its place in the world. The policy problem is 
to maximise security subject to the constraints. In principle, solving such an optimisation problem 
involves thinking forward and reasoning back: working out where you want to be at the end and 
calculating how to get there in a way consistent with the available budget that equates the marginal 
security benefits of the defence budget to its opportunity costs. 
 In practice, the policy results not from constrained optimisation but from a less coherent 
process of political, bureaucratic and diplomatic battles. But for a long duration analysis of the type I 
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wish to consider it is more useful to follow the principles and I will look at the elements of the value 
chain in the reverse order involved in thinking forward and reasoning back. I begin with security, the 
geo-strategic position and the use of military capability by the two countries; move back to their 
force structures; then consider the acquisition of labour, capital and technology to provide those 
forces and the industry that provides the weapons; then end with the defence budget and the 
budgeting process.  Hartley & Macdonald (2010) provides more detail on the UK and Coulomb & 
Fontanel (2005) on France. 
Strategy involves making and implementing hard choices; usually given a set of unattractive 
options, in an uncertain environment, with limited information.  How these choices are made 
depends on the nature of the state and in many respects the French and British states are quite 
different. In the conclusion, I will make some comments on the efficiency of the process by which 
this was done in the two countries.  
2. Geostrategic context and conflicts 
From the successful invasion of Britain by the Normans in 1066 from France to the beginning of 
the twentieth century, Britain and France tended to be natural enemies and Britain repeatedly 
feared another invasion from France. 2 The enmity of Britain and France resulted partly from their 
contiguity and partly from their strategic objectives. From the 17th to 19th centuries,  France tried to 
dominate continental Europe and Britain tried to ensure that nobody dominated Europe. Geography 
meant that France needed a large standing army, Britain a large navy. Occasionally they were allies, 
as in the 1853-6 Crimean War against Russia, though there is the, probably apocryphal, story that 
the British commander in Crimea kept calling the enemy the French rather than the Russians. The 
main change came with the Entente Cordiale in the early 20th century when both perceived that 
Germany was the bigger threat. France and Britain both acquired large colonial empires, though in 
somewhat different ways. Imperial history is controversial, but it has been suggested, for instance by 
Windrow (2010), that for Britain the flag tended to follow trade, sometimes rather reluctantly, while 
for France trade tended to follow the flag, again sometimes rather reluctantly.  
Although their experiences during World War II were very different, both countries emerged 
from the war as impoverished victors: permanent members of the UN Security Council, with great 
power pretensions but little money. Among European countries, Britain and France are exceptional 
in having few doubts about the legitimacy of the use of force. As a result both have maintained the 
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capability to fight and in the years following World War II, both did a lot of fighting. France withdrew 
from Indochina after the defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1953. War started in Algeria in 1954 and by 1958 
a large part of the French defence budget was directed to North Africa. The acquisition of power by 
General de Gaulle in 1958 was followed by withdrawal from Algeria, a progressive reduction in the 
defence effort and an improvement in the economic situation. The conflict in Algeria also caused a 
crisis in civil-military relations, which has no British equivalent. For France the large wars in 
Indochina and Algeria made decolonisation more traumatic than for Britain whose decolonising wars 
in Palestine, Malaya,  Kenya, Cyprus and Aden were smaller. Britain fought in the Korean War, had a 
domestic insurgency in Northern Ireland, for which there is no French equivalent, and fought the 
Falklands/Malvinas War with Argentina in 1982. Britain & France fought beside each other in the 
1991 Gulf War, former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, after the 2001 invasion, and in the 2011 Libyan 
intervention; though they differed sharply on the wisdom of the invasion of Iraq in 2003.  Both 
intervened in former colonies, for instance the UK in 2001 in Sierra Leone, France in a more 
extensive and systematic way, particularly in Africa. Both contributed to UN peacekeeping forces.  
Britain had gained a reputation for effective counter-insurgency after Malaya, Kenya and Northern 
Ireland, but this was somewhat tarnished by its performance in Iraq and Afghanistan. British troops 
have died in action in every year since 1945, with the exception of 1968.  
Probably the crucial strategic episode for both countries was their joint  invasion of Suez in 
conjunction with Israel, in 1956. They were forced to withdraw by US threats to their currencies; a 
rare example of the effective use of the threat of economic sanctions. Britain and France drew quite 
different lessons from the episode. Britain decided that since the US was a global power that could 
not be relied upon to support British interests, Britain must keep as close as possible to the US to try 
to exert influence. France decided that since the US was a global power that could not be relied 
upon to support French interests, France must establish its independence. This independence was 
subsequently signalled by President de Gaulle’s withdrawal in 1966 from NATO’s integrated military 
command,  though not from NATO,  on an issue of nuclear doctrine. President  Chirac attempted to 
return France to the integrated military command in 1997, but could not agree terms; President 
Sarkozy achieved return  in 2009. 
 With the collapse of the Soviet Union after 1990, neither country faced a direct military 
threat to their homeland and military power seemed ineffective against other threats like terrorism, 
global warming or economic crisis. But since both countries could see threats to their global 
interests, both continued to spend a much higher share of output on defence than other European 
countries.  
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3. Force structures 
Both countries tried to maintain balanced forces that replicated, on a smaller scale, the 
structures and types of equipment of the super-powers. In both cases there was an element of 
façade: the forces looked more impressive on paper, or on parade, than in combat. This was 
revealed, for instance, by the limited forces that each were able to deploy in the 1991 Gulf War. In 
the case of France, Coulomb & Fontanel (2005) call this Potemkinism. 
Britain tested a nuclear weapon in 1952, France in 1960. The UK got its nuclear weapons systems 
relatively cheaply, bought or copied from the US, particularly after the Nassau agreement between 
President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan in 1962.  France found the cost of financing the 
development of its independent nuclear forces (force de frappe or force de dissuasion) was high and 
at the expense of conventional forces, as Brauer and van Tuyll (2008) discuss. Between 1964 and 
1969 equipment expenditure took over half of the French military budget, and in 1967 nuclear 
expenditures took half of the equipment expenditure. There was probably more opposition to 
nuclear forces in the UK than in France, but UK governments maintained the deterrent. 
Britain announced the end of conscription in the 1957 defence review and the last conscripts 
finished in the early 1960s. France announced the end of conscription in the 1994 White Paper and 
the last conscripts finished in 2001. Partly because of the reliance on all volunteer forces, AVF, 
Britain tended to have fewer troops and a more capital intensive defence posture than France. For 
Britain, inter-operability with the US was important and this may have led to higher specifications for 
weapons relative to France. For instance in 1985 for very similar military expenditures France had 
563,000 in the armed forces compared to 334,000 in the UK. Even by 2008, after the end of 
conscription, despite very similar military expenditures, France had 255,000 in the armed forces 
(plus 99,000 paramilitaries in the Gendarmerie) compared to the UK’s 181,000.  The Gendarmerie 
complicate comparison because there is no British equivalent. Although paramilitary, most of their 
activity is normal police duties. They are now under the authority of the Ministry of Interior, but for 
many years were the responsibility of the Ministry of Defence.  After 2008 both countries 
announced large cuts in personnel numbers.  The French in the 2008 and 2013 Defence White 
Papers and the UK in the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review. 
The similarity in their geo-strategic  positions made co-operation between France and the UK 
attractive in principle, but the dissimilarity in their interests, including their rivalry over dominance in 
Europe, made co-operation difficult in practice.  Though there was some collaboration in weapons 
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procurement, such as the Anglo-French Jaguar aircraft (as well as the civilian Concorde), they often 
found it difficult to collaborate with each other and ended up competing. France withdrew from the 
Eurofighter consortium (now EADS, BAE and Finmeccanica) to build the Rafale. A late Cold War 
comparison is provided by Boyer et al. (1989). Despite the title Franco British Defence Co-operation: 
A New Entente Cordiale, the papers in the collection tend to bring out the difficulties of co-
operation. Hartley (2008) discusses recent European defence collaboration.  The European Union 
excludes defence from single market regulations under article 346, but from 2006 there has been an 
intergovernmental regime on  defence procurement to encourage competition in defence 
procurement. 
Britain had traditionally been sceptical about the European Security and Defence Policy, ESDP, 
preferring such issues be left to NATO, whereas France tended to support developing a European 
pillar, as long as it followed French policies. But in the 1998 St Malo meeting with President Chirac, 
Prime Minister  Blair endorsed ESDP.  It is unclear whether this endorsement helped ESDP, which 
was  renamed the Common Security and Defence policy in the Lisbon treaty of 2007.  Britain and 
France signed two Lancaster House  treaties in November 2010 covering nuclear research, the 
development of a joint Unmanned Aerial Vehicle by BAE and Dassault and cooperation on aircraft 
carriers. These agreements reflect the financial pressures on both governments, and have been 
labelled an entente frugale.  
 
4. Force acquisition and procurement 
The defence budget is usually split into various sub-totals, including personnel costs;  equipment 
expenditure to acquire new  weapons; operations and maintenance costs, including fuel; research 
and development; and infrastructure such as construction of military bases and housing for troops. 
Good international data on these sub-totals are  difficult to get, but they appear to differ 
substantially between countries. The cost of military personnel is less than a quarter of the US 
budget, and total personnel costs around a third, because it has a relatively capital intensive military. 
In the UK personnel costs are just over 40% of the budget and have tended to be closer to 50% in 
France. By international standards these are rather low proportions; personnel costs are often 
around three quarters of military budgets in countries that adopt more labour intensive military 
postures, as most do.  The effect of moving to AVF on the share of personnel costs in the defence 
budget is ambiguous: the troops are paid higher wages but there are fewer of them. There are data 
for most members of NATO and Bove and Cavatorta (2012) use these to examine the determination 
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of the various shares of the defence budget, though they do not have data for France. They find no 
effect of the move to AVF on the share of personnel: the price increase and the quantity reduction 
offset each other.  Fontanel & Smith (1990) look at the determinants of the composition of 
expenditure in France.   
The relationship between the state and the military sector was rather different in the two 
countries, partly reflecting their different industrial traditions: French  dirigisme, British laissez-faire. 
In France a tight symbiotic relationship existed between the procurement agency, the Direction 
G   rale de l’Armeme t (DGA) a d what were originally largely nationalised arms firms. There has 
been some privatisation, but the state still retains a considerable shareholding in many arms 
companies.  Ownership does not imply control and  state ownership can mean that the arms 
industry controls the state rather than the state controls the arms industry.  Even when the firms are 
private, the state as sole buyer of weapons in the country, has considerable leverage.  
In the UK in 1979 much of the British arms industry was state owned including four of the seven 
firms paid over £100m a year by the Ministry of defence. The Royal Ordnance factories had always 
been state owned;  British Aerospace and British Shipbuilders  had been formed through the 1977 
nationalisation by the Labour government of aircraft and shipbuilding companies; and Rolls Royce 
had been nationalised in 1971 by a Conservative government after being bankrupted by the 
development of the RB211 civil engine.  Subsequently, Mrs Thatcher privatised all the arms firms 
and introduced competition under Peter Levene, the head of defence procurement during the 
1980s. This commitment to competition was given credibility by occasional purchases of foreign 
weapons.  This reliance on competition and markets meant that from 1979 the UK did not have an 
explicit defence industrial policy until 2002, when the Labour Government announced one that 
developed into the 2005 Defence Industrial Strategy and a subsequent Defence Technology Strategy. 
The coherence and feasibility of these strategies were widely questioned.  
In France, the DGA acted as a patron for the industry, using procurement and export promotion 
as part of a coherent industrial strategy developed over decades, in which defence firms, mainly 
state owned, had considerable freedom to develop weapons they thought would sell abroad.  To a 
certain extent the armed forces and politicians were marginalised by technocrats trained at the 
Ecole Polytechnique who moved between the arms firms and the DGA.  Kolodziej (1987) is the 
classic source.3  Because of the more positive attitude to the state in France than the UK, the human 
                                                          
3
 Kapstei  a d Oudot (2009) comme t that “Although the book was published twe ty years ago its a alysis of 
the DGA a d the Fre ch procureme t system remai s compelli g.” 
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capital available to the French state was greater than in the UK where the best and the brightest 
tended to gravitate to finance rather than government. 
Weapons acquisition involves hard choices between quantity, quality, time and cost. For 
instance, urgent operational requirements in combat have to be provided quickly, which adds to the 
cost , and must use readily available technology. Adding quality, through enhanced performance, 
faces rapidly decreasing returns, the marginal cost of extra performance rises as the target 
performance rises. At the top of the line, adding the last 5% to performance may double the cost. 
The contracting system also matters, both cost-plus and fixed-price after competition have major 
disadvantages. For instance, fixed-price contracts provide incentives to reduce costs, which cost plus 
contracts do not;  but cost plus allows flexibility for design changes during the project, which are 
expensive under fixed price contracts. The UK has tended to alternate between the two methods as 
it discovered the disadvantage of each.  
In terms of the efficiency of the weapons procurement system France seems to have done  
better than Britain.  Kapstei  a d Oudot (2009) say “Beginning in the early 1990s, France embarked 
on a series of policy reforms that enabled the state to contain skyrocketing weapons costs. We 
emphasise three, inter-related aspects of the defence acquisition environment in France that 
favoured cost containment: first, hard budget constraints; second the great technical capacity that 
the French government brought to bear on the weapons acquisition process, coupled with its 
iterative relationship with a small number of suppliers; and third the use of contracting techniques 
that empowered project ma agers.”   
In contrast, Bernard Gray, who wrote a scathing report on British procurement and subsequently 
became Chief of Defence Materiel, said in evidence to the House of Commons Defence Committee 
in January 2010 that when he began the review he was told by the Treasury (the UK Finance 
Ministry) that there were three main problems. Firstly the defence programme was substantially 
out of balance. Secondly there was a lack of clarity and leadership in the Ministry of  Defence main 
building, particularly at the head of the organisation, and a lack of accountability and responsibility. 
Thirdly there were Insufficient skills inside the procurement organisation, Defence Equipment & 
Support, to discharge the job.   Lord Levene  in his independent  report to MoD on Defence Reform 
ide tified a structural ‘i ability to take tough, timely decisio s i  the Defe ce i terest, particularly 
those  ecessary to e sure fi a cial co trol a d a  affordable defe ce programme’, Levene (2011, 
p13).  There is some debate about whether responsibility for this recurrent imbalance between 
aspirations and resources should be attributed to planning  failures by the Ministry of Defence or to 
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political failures by successive governments who were unwilling to make hard choices. Chin (2004) 
discusses the history of procurement reform in Britain.  
A major cause of the UK programme being substantially out of balance was the lack of a hard 
budget constraint:  projects were not cancelled if costs overrun. This reinforced the incentives for all 
the participants in the procurement process to contribute to a “co spiracy of optimism” about time, 
cost and performance. Then as the optimism proved ill-founded and the projects  ran over-budget 
they were not cancelled. Instead the number purchased was reduced, increasing unit costs, and 
expenditure postponed, also increasing unit costs, creating what was called a “bow wave” of 
planned expenditure. Such postponement is not unknown in France, such as during the construction 
of the nuclear powered aircraft carrier, the Charles de Gaulle, during the 1990s, but has tended to be 
a greater problem in the UK.  In 2010 the incoming Conservative administration claimed that there 
was a £38 billion funding gap between planned expenditure and available resources. This is close to 
o e year’s defe ce spe di g.  Chalmers (2011) discusses the size of the gap. 
Lord Currie  in his independent report to the Ministry of Defence on non-competitive pricing  in 
the UK made very similar points to Kapstein and Oudot (2009) about the technical experience of the 
French DGA staff relative to their British equivalents, Currie (2011p52&139).  But Currie rejected a 
move towards the French system of more legally formalised contracting system and less changes in 
requirement, because of the strong differences in culture and preferences between the two 
systems. Hard budget constraints, cancelling projects that went over time or budget would provide 
the right incentives against the optimism bias, but may not be credible in the UK.  Currie notes that 
in the US programmes should be cancelled if a 25% overrun occurs, but they rarely are cancelled, 
since the Secretary of Defense can override this by submitting a report detailing why the programme 
is essential.  
French foreign policy was often driven by the desire to export arms and that equipment was 
designed in the light of perceived foreign demand rather than French military needs, prompting 
complaints by the armed services.  Coulomb & Fontanel (2005) comment  that French arms exports 
were sometimes promoted without any economic or commercial logic, particularly when firms tried 
to compensate for domestic budget cuts by increasing exports.  France lost $1.2bn on the $3.4 bn 
1993 order for 436 Leclerc tanks for the UAE, mainly from problems with foreign exchange hedging.  
In 2003 the French government ordered the arms firms not to offer products below production 
price. The choice in February 2012 by India of the Rafale as the preferred bid in its fighter 
competition was said to be on the basis of a low price.  
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British foreign policy could also be driven by arms exports, in particular the Al Yamamah 
programme of arms exports to Saudi Arabia. The contract, initially signed in 1985, was worth about 
£40 billion over its first two decades and is still continuing today as Project Salam. Over the period 
2008-2010, SIPRI records both countries as exporting arms of about one billion dollars a year, though 
earlier in the decade France had been exporting about twice as much. 
5. Industrial Structure 
Despite the close relationship between the French state and the arms firms, there has been 
much less restructuring and globalization of the arms industry in France than in the UK, where 
market forces have tended to operate rather more. This is reflected in the relative sizes of their arms 
companies.  In the SIPRI (2012) ranking of arms producing companies, the European companies that 
appear in the top 10 are  BAE Systems of the UK, ranked 2  with 2010 arms sales $32,880m; EADS, a 
multinational company, ranked 7, $16,360m;  Finmeccanica of Italy, which is 30% state owned, 
ranked 8, $14,410m. French companies (with their rank) in the list were Thales (11), Safran (16), 
DCNS (22), CEA (42), Nexter (55) and Dassault (61). Other UK companies (with their rank) were Rolls 
Royce (17), Babcock (29) Cobham (40), Serco (44), QinetQ (50), GKN (66), Chemring (74), Ultra (75), 
Meggit (82). Total arms sales by French companies, excluding the share of EADS, was $20bn, total 
sales by British companies was $50bn. Much of these revenues came from production abroad: BAE 
got much of its sales from production in the US and Thales got much of its sales from production in 
the UK.   
While the DGA has tried to encourage consolidation and rationalisation, progress has been slow. 
French military  industrial politics can be quite complex. The French state has a 27% shareholding in 
Thales. Dassault increased its stake to 26% in 2008, then replaced Denis Ranque, the chief executive 
who had built up Thales, by Luc Vigneron, who was himself replaced by Jean Bernard Levy in 2012.  
EADS had wanted to acquire Thales, but was stopped by the French state. In what the Financial 
Times (16/2/2012, p19) calls “o e of those stra ge quirks of Fre ch i dustry, EADS ow s 46% of 
Dassault Aviatio  but has  o co trol.”  
EADS was formed in 2000. In addition to its civil Airbus business, it has a substantial defence 
business including the troubled A400M transport aircraft; Cassidian, the German based defence 
subsidiary and produces a range of military helicopters through eurocopter. BAE had acquired a 
share of EADS as a consequence of  the 20% British contribution to Airbus, but had disposed of its 
share in 2006 to concentrate on defence. The fact that the Dassault Rafale fighter aircraft had 
beaten the Eurofighter-Typhoon (produced by EADS, BAE Systems and Finmeccanica) for a large 
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Indian contract in 2012 prompted EADS and BAE to discuss merging.  A merger would have created 
the world’s largest arms producer. O  SIPRI (2012) figures for 2010, BAE+EADS would have arms 
sales of almost $50bn compared with $36bn for Lockheed Martin.  The issues that arose in the 
failure of the proposed merger of BAE & EADS are informative about European defence industrial 
policy.4 
EADS is registered as a company in the Netherlands. France and Germany each held 22.5% of the 
company, France through the  Lagardère company (7.5%) and the French state (15%) and Germany 
through Daimler (22.5%). The Spanish state has 5.45%.  Both Daimler and Lagardère  were reluctant 
owners, forced by their governments to hold the shares to keep the German and French holdings 
equal. Following the failure of the proposed merger, the  French and German holdings were reduced 
to 12%. 
Ian King & Tom Enders, the chief executives of BAE and EADS, said in a joint article5 that the 
merger discussio  did  ot reflect weak ess because the two firms “are both stro g busi esses with 
clearly defined strategies that have enabled them to make progress in the past five years, and which 
would take them forward as i depe de t compa ies.”  However both companies were perceived to 
have certain weaknesses. BAE was seen as too dependent on defence, which looked to be a 
declining market. EADS was seen as too subject to the political influence of France and Germany. It 
had  argued that state involvement in its ownership had inhibited its efforts to make a big 
acquisition in the US and may have hindered its bid to win the US military tanker order. King & 
Enders hoped that merger would reduce both the weaknesses: creating a normal company without 
state influence and equally balanced between civil and defence work.  
EADS Visio  2020 Strategy set out i  2007 by Louis Gallois, Tom E der’s predecessor as CEO, 
was to turn EADS revenue stream into something similar to Boei g’s with half comi g from civil 
aircraft and half coming from defence, which was seen as less cyclical. Boeing and EADS both 
produce military aircraft, electronics, missiles and space equipment. BAE has a much wider defence 
portfolio also including military vehicles, artillery, small arms and ammunition and warships, both 
surface and submarine. Thus the BAE defence portfolio has a less good fit with aerospace than that 
of Boeing or EADS.   
Many were sceptical of the merger on commercial grounds given the difficulty of 
successfully merging two very different companies and the fact that academic studies indicate that 
most merger a d acquisitio  activity destroys value. BAE’s past history of  deal-making did not 
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inspire confidence. Many had questioned the wisdom of its recent US purchases, its 2006 sale of its 
Airbus stake or, further back, its acquisition and divestment of a car company, a construction 
company and a property company.  The shareholders in the two companies chose to own them for 
rather different reasons and were not sympathetic to the merger. BAEs largest shareholders 
expressed opposition to the deal, partly because BAE pays a much higher dividend that EADS. EADS 
shareholders expressed concern that the suggested 60:40 split did not reflect the true value of the 
companies and this caused a sharp decline in EADS share price after the merger announcement.  
While there were commercial  questions about the merger and issues about what the 
merged company would be called, the main obstacles were political. Merger would have required 
approval by the governments of France, Germany, Spain, UK and US (since BAE produces so much in 
the US) and of the European Commission under EU Competition Law.  One tension in the case for 
the merger was that commercial weaknesses were political strengths and vice versa. For instance, 
because the companies did not overlap very much, there were few economic gains from synergies or 
rationalisation, a commercial disadvantage; but there would consequently be few losses of jobs or 
sovereignty, a political advantage.  After the discussion  of the proposed merger leaked in 
September 2012 there was an intense international debate before the merger was blocked in 
October by the German government; apparently because there would be no German head office.  
Many were surprised by the fact that it was the Germans who vetoed the merger, while the French 
and British government were quite supportive of it. Whereas successive UK governments have been 
rather relaxed about the multi-national consolidation of the defence industry in response to market 
forces, French governments had been more cautious. Thus the support for the merger was seen as 
indicative of a change in French attitudes to the globalisation of the defence industry.  
6. Budgets 
The budgeting process appears to have been smoother in France than in the UK, which 
conducted regular agonised reappraisals during repeated defence reviews. Except for the 1997-8 
Strategic Defence Review these reviews were prompted by economic crises. France had to make 
similar adjustments, but seemed to do it more smoothly, with  fewer major White Papers during the 
Cold War period. There were major reviews in 1994 and 2008, and another smaller review in 2013 
which continued the cost cutting. A simple model of the budgeting process is given in an appendix. 
The long term pattern in the UK since World War II was for systems costs (e.g. the cost of a type 
of platform between generation) to grow around 5-10%p.a. in real terms, though this may be 
slowing.  Defence budgets grew a lot more slowly. For a while, the imbalance would be pushed  into 
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the future by postponing work on projects. At some stage the growing imbalance between 
resources, capabilities and commitments would become unsustainable and would be temporarily 
resolved by a defence review. The defence review would sacrifice capabilities and commitments  
bringing the programme back into balance. Then the imbalances would start to grow again. In recent 
years the problem has been worsened by the fact that UK Ministers of Defence have had periods in 
office as short as that of French governments during the Fourth Republic. 
 The share of military expenditure in GDP is usually a good measure of the opportunity cost of 
military expenditure in market societies. It is not a good measure when things are not valued at 
market prices, for instance because of rationing during wartime or because conscripts are paid 
below market wages. Share for the two countries 1948-2012 are shown in figure 1. They look 
remarkably similar, though the French share may under-estimate the opportunity cost because 
conscription was maintained for longer. In 1948 in both countries the share was between 5-6% of 
GDP  then jumped to around 9%: Britain rearming for the Korean War, France spending on the war 
in Indochina. Subsequently the share fell in both countries, interrupted in the case of France by the 
Algerian conflict.  From about 1960 to 1995 the British share was slightly higher than France.  The 
marked increase in the British share after 1979 in response to the commitment to NATO for 3% 
growth and the tension following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is not matched in France.  From 
the mid 1990s they are almost identical.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Share of Military Expenditure in the UK (SUK) and France (SF) 1949-2012. 
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  In order to investigate the adjustment process that maintained this similarity, the Johansen 
procedure was use to model the shares of military expenditure in France, tsf , and the UK, tsu , both 
of which are probably integrated of order one, I(1).  Despite the similarity in the graph over the 
period 1949-2012 there was little evidence of cointegration, though over the period 1960-2012, 
assuming unrestricted intercepts and restricted trends, there was evidence for one cointegrating 
vector. The long run relation for 1960-2012 (t statistics in parentheses) is:  
ˆ0.894 0.02
(3.52) ( 1.01)
t t tsf su t z  

 
The coefficient on the UK share is not significantly different from one,  t=-0.41, so the long run 
relationship is for shares of military expenditure in the two countries to be equal. The vector error 
correction model is: 
1 1 1
ˆ0.137 0.01 0.20
( 4.07) ( 0.09) (2.21)
t t t tsf z sf su        
   
2 ˆ0.42; 0.11R    
1 1 1
ˆ0.021 0.14 0.26
(0.38) (0.66) (1.71)
t t t tsu z sf su       
 
2 ˆ0.09; 0.18R    
Constants were included in the equations, but are not reported.6 The French share responds 
significantly to the deviations between the French and UK shares in the previous year and to the 
previous year’s cha ge i  the UK share.  The UK equation has no significant coefficients, so the UK 
share  is close to a random walk, and more volatile than the French share, with a much higher 
standard error of regression.   
These estimates suggest that it is the French share that adjusts to the UK share to maintain 
equality of shares of military expenditure in GDP. Of course, this is a very simple indicative model 
and the results may be sensitive to measurement errors and the inclusion of other variables, though 
the results are not changed when the US share of military expenditure is included in the system. 
 
Conclusion 
Efficient defence planning would ensure that the marginal security benefits of military 
expenditure equalled the opportunity costs. France and Britain valued the security benefits of 
                                                          
6
 These estimates are very similar to those for the period 1960-2009 reported in earlier versions of the paper. 
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military capability much more than other European powers, such as Germany, and consequently 
spent a much higher share of output on defence. In 1985 the UK share was 5%, the French share 4% 
and the German share 3%. In 2007 the French and British shares were 2.5%, the German share 1.3%. 
Britain and France also did the bulk of European defence research and development. This willingness 
to devote a higher share of output to defence revealed the higher French and British valuation of 
military capability, including nuclear weapons and power projection possibilities, relative to other 
European countries. As the threat declined so did the share of military expenditure in output, but it 
remained well above that of their European neighbours.  The military capability they could field 
declined through time partly because of the declining share and partly because of the relative price 
effect as the cost of subsequent generations of military equipment rose relative to the general price 
level, as discussed in the appendix. This drove capability down in both countries, perhaps a little 
more in the UK because of its higher capital intensity, its preference for performance and its poorer 
control of costs. The adjustment in France also seems smoother than in the UK, which showed 
abrupt resolution of recurrent contradictions through defence reviews. The relation between state 
and industry in the two countries was quite different, the British laissez faire versus the French 
dirigisme, and the British arms industry consolidated and globalised rather more quickly than the 
French industry.     
The long-run downward pressure on capability is unlikely to disappear in the future and both 
countries face economic constraints, including the need to reduce the national debt, which will 
restrict the growth of their defence budgets in the medium term. While both countries retain a taste 
for military intervention, the limited budgets mean that they will need to prioritise the range of tasks 
that they will prepare for and the types of equipment required to complete those tasks. This will 
require abandoning some commitments and capabilities, purely because they are unaffordable. 
Choosing what to abandon (such as nuclear deterrent or power projection) and who will suffer 
(army, navy or airforce) will be politically sensitive.  The choices may be made a little less hard, by 
more cooperation such as that envisaged in the 2010 treaties, but while strategic and financial 
pressures  make cooperation attractive, the politics of the two countries make it difficult. Thus given 
past experience,  one cannot be optimistic about the possibilities of cooperation.  
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Appendix  
Suppose optimisation of welfare, a function of security and consumption, gives a demand function 
for military output with unit elasticities with respect to real income, Y, the relative price of military 
to civilian goods, P, and the threat T. 
/M kYT P   (1) 
This implies that the share of military expenditure in GDP will be a function of the threat, which is an 
assumption widely used in the literature:  
/s PM Y kT   
Suppose the supply function is constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas function of equipment 
(capital, K) and troops (labour, L) and efficiency, A. 
(1 )M AK L    (2) 
Where   is the share of equipment in military expenditure /KP K PM  , and KP  is the relative 
price of military equipment, LP  of military labour.  Denoting logarithms by lower case letters and 
taking first differences of (1) gives and equation for the growth rate of real military output 
m y t p      
And (2) implies that the growth rate of military prices is 
(1 )K Lp p p        
So the growth rate of military output is given by: the growth in output (ability to pay), plus the 
growth in the threat; minus a relative price effect which depends on the rate of growth of the prices 
of military labour and capital: 
( (1 ) )K Lm y t p p           
Military wages tend to grow in line with the economy (even if conscripts are paid a fraction of the 
free market wage, that fraction cannot fall indefinitely) so Lp y   . Then 
( )Km y p t     . 
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The UK had more capital intensive forces (a higher value of  ) and higher technology equipment, 
(trying  to maintain inter-operability with the US) and greater cost escalation (a larger 
Kp ).  Thus 
its budget was more squeezed than France with a lower value of  , lower cost escalation, plus 
perhaps an ability through conscription to set, at least for a time,  Lp y   . Although this model is 
not operational because we cannot measure military prices or output, it provides a qualitative 
framework to consider some of the issues. 
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